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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated properties 
known as “brownfields.” It has three principal parts. First, we introduce the brownfields phenomenon and 
its drivers, drawing on the body of available empirical evidence to discuss characteristics of individual 
brownfield redevelopment projects. Second, we present findings from a recent study we have conducted 
that examines the relative attractiveness to private developers of public interventions to promote 
brownfields redevelopment. Third, we briefly summarize some of the problems with brownfields 
development and policy and propose an approach to promote wider societal benefits of brownfields 
development. We conclude with several broad questions about brownfields policy and practice.  
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  The Brownfields Phenomenon:  
Much Ado about Something or the Timing of the Shrewd? 
Kris Wernstedt, Lauren Heberle, Anna Alberini, and Peter Meyer1 
1. Introduction2  
Critics argue that traditional federal regulatory approaches have discouraged private parties 
from becoming involved in properties that are perceived to be contaminated. These so-called 
“brownfields” number in the hundreds of thousands nationwide. Owners of the properties and 
prospective buyers, fearing liability for expensive cleanups, often opt not to develop them, yet 
left unattended such sites may pose threats to public health and the environment and depress the 
economy of local neighborhoods. Opportunities for more sustainable communities may be 
ignored even as rural or greenfield (uncontaminated and undeveloped) sites attract new 
development, contributing to continued underinvestment in distressed areas.  
In response to the abundance of contaminated sites and the problems or missed 
opportunities they entail, federal, state, and local initiatives to address brownfields have 
blossomed over the last decade. Most of these have provided some sort of public intervention or 
relief—direct financial support for regeneration of brownfields, easing of regulatory burdens, or 
reduction in the liability for future cleanups and environmental damage once certain cleanup 
standards are met—to public and private parties interested in undertaking brownfields 
regeneration. The implicit logic is that the social and financial benefits that brownfields 
redevelopment can provide—whether reuse of a single isolated property or a revitalization of an 
entire distressed neighborhood—warrant public intervention. Unfortunately, however, the 
enthusiasm for brownfields reuse generally has not been matched by systematic, careful 
documentation of actual practice at a wide range of sites. It is thus not clear whether the 
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1 enthusiasm for brownfields and its claim of community benefits offer more than rhetorical cover 
for what are essentially real estate deals at a relatively small number of properties.  
This paper collects evidence from a variety of sources to ground brownfields 
redevelopment rhetoric in actual practice. Although it stops well short of answering whether such 
redevelopment is a wise public goal, it does aim at documenting the reality of brownfields as a 
precursor to understanding how public attention to brownfields can be made more effective. We 
start in section 2 with a brief background on the brownfields problem; the federal, state, and local 
efforts that have emerged to address it; and its nexus with community sustainability. In section 3, 
we present five stylized myths about brownfields and draw on a range of sources to discuss these 
myths. These sources include several surveys we have conducted of public and private parties 
involved in brownfields development and other studies and reports from the academic and 
practitioner literatures on brownfields. We then turn in section 4 to a recent study we conducted 
of the relative attractiveness to private developers of public interventions to promote brownfields 
redevelopment. We briefly summarize the significance of the findings from our developer study 
in section 5, where we propose an approach that can help local communities plan more shrewdly 
for sustainable brownfields regeneration. We conclude in section 6 with several challenges for 
the brownfields community.  
2. Background 
Brownfield properties are not on the roster of sites cleaned up under the federal Superfund 
program, but it is the federal legislation that gave rise to Superfund—the 1980 federal 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)—and 
related state statutes that most commentators identify as the chief culprits driving the brownfields 
problem. CERCLA has imposed a liability regime for the cleanup of sites with hazardous 
substances on a wide array of parties, including those who generated or transported the 
substances, as well as current and former site owners and lenders who financed activities that 
generated the substances. Many state mini-Superfund laws have similar features for sites that 
may not be of significant federal interest.  
As a result of these laws, owners and prospective buyers of properties thought to be 
contaminated are leery of attracting regulatory attention and becoming responsible for cleanup. 
The parties who may have caused the contamination may be long gone or be unable to pay  
for cleanup, and few of the brownfield sites would qualify for public funding under Superfund 
and state counterparts. And by most accounts, this problem bedevils communities across the 
2 country. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1987) has reported that the nation has between 
130,000 and 450,000 potential hazardous waste sites, based on data collected from several 
federal agencies in the 1980s. Later estimates have placed this figure in the range of 500,000–
600,000 (Simons, 1998), or even as high as 1 million sites (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2004).  
Federal legislative and regulatory reforms reduced the barriers imposed by CERCLA 
throughout the 1990s, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Brownfields 
Program has supported hundreds of pilot projects that have resulted in the assessment of 
thousands of properties. Perhaps most significantly from the standpoint of national policy, the 
signing of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act in early 2002 
has provided firmer statutory footing for expanded liability protection and funding. In 2003, EPA 
provided $75 million in grants to states, local governments, and nonprofits under the new law, 
bringing its investment in brownfields since 1995 to over $700 million.  
In addition to federal efforts, all but a handful of states now offer voluntary cleanup 
programs to encourage owners and developers to come forward and voluntarily address site 
contamination, in exchange for less onerous requirements and certainty that state authorities  
will not continue to hold them liable for additional cleanup. These programs operate in a less 
burdensome and intrusive fashion than longer-standing enforcement-led programs under federal 
and state law. They typically scale back environmental requirements by tailoring cleanup 
requirements to the expected future use of the properties rather than requiring, for example, the 
same cleanup at a parcel whether it is slated for development as an industrial park or as a 
playground. The new programs may further provide some form of liability release upon state 
approval of cleanup and sometimes delegate state regulatory functions—including monitoring 
and oversight of cleanup activities—to licensed consultants. Many states also offer incentives  
to spur private investment in the inner-city communities where contaminated properties often  
are located.  
If one compares the state of affairs vis-à-vis the redevelopment of brownfields today to that 
of 10 years ago, it is clear that federal and state promotion of brownfields has yielded numerous 
success stories of idled and underutilized contaminated properties that now house a variety of 
economic activities. Whether these efforts have helped to revitalize distressed areas and 
contribute to a more sustainable community is a more difficult question, however. Part of the 
problem is that it is difficult to measure revitalization and sustainability at a community level. 
Simple metrics such as job creation and tax revenues are useful, but when reported as gross 
measures they may fail to distinguish between new jobs and jobs transferred from other activities 
3 and often obscure more nuanced issues of community vitality, social cohesion, quality of life, 
and environmental justice. In addition, most brownfield efforts have taken a property-by-
property approach that aims at supporting the highest and best use of individual properties. 
Possible positive and negative spillovers from redevelopment of a property beyond that 
property’s boundaries and such larger neighborhood issues as poor infrastructure, crime, poverty, 
and failing schools typically remain secondary concerns in brownfields discussions.  
3. Exploring the Myths 
As Eisen notes in his work on the nexus of sustainability and brownfields development 
(Eisen, 1999; Eisen, 2002), the remediation and reuse of brownfield sites in the United States 
provides an opportunity to both reverse the decay of already developed areas and slow 
unsustainable development trends throughout the country. Each brownfield redevelopment 
decision itself can trigger a variety of concerns related to the long-term vision of a community, 
threats to public health and nature, economic livelihoods, social equity, and public participation. 
Addressing these concerns in an integrated fashion at the intersection of social, economic, and 
environmental forces in principle would exemplify the expansive view of brownfields 
redevelopment as a palliative to the environmental and social stresses of urban America.  
The implementation of such an integrated approach will be based on a number of premises 
about brownfields revitalization. These premises relate to, among other features, the nature of 
brownfield properties; the expectations and behavior of public and private parties involved in the 
development, environmental, and financial risks; the importance of subsidies; and the investment 
climate of host communities. Many of the premises may have a factual base, while others may be 
rooted in unsubstantiated assertions of mixed quality or outright misunderstandings. Collectively 
we will refer to these as brownfields myths. Our goal here is to explore these myths and draw on 
available evidence to discuss their legitimacy, thereby grounding the rhetoric of brownfields 
revitalization.  
Existing Literature 
The empirical literature on brownfields—a topic that cuts across many disciplines and 
scales and is open to a wide range of methodological approaches—remains undeveloped relative 
to its potential. The planning and economics communities have examined the intersection of 
contamination, housing values, political economy, and local government activities for decades 
(Anderson & Greenberg, 1982; Clean Sites, 1992; Gayer, Hamilton, & Viscusi, 2002; Glaser, 
4 1994; Hird, 1994; Ketkar, 1992; Kiel & Zabel, 2001; McCluskey & Rausser, 2003; Page, 1986; 
Wernstedt, 2001), but this work has not focused on brownfield trends and policies to promote 
brownfields redevelopment. Rather, the bulk of the work in the latter realm comes from two 
overlapping directions.  
First, much of what we know about brownfields and the barriers to their redevelopment has 
come from case studies of individual redevelopment projects, where public incentives to reduce 
regulatory and economic uncertainty have appeared critical to project success (Bartsch, Collaton, 
& Pepper, 1996; Pepper, 1997; Walker et al., 1998). Direct local government participation in 
redevelopment projects through ownership and leadership also has appeared important in these 
studies, although Meyer and Lyons (2000) identified one group of private sector brownfields 
redevelopers who largely eschew such involvement. Recent work also has explored the 
economics of brownfields redevelopment, suggesting that contamination may not be as 
significant a constraint to property transactions as the prevailing sentiment of the 1980s and early 
1990s suggested (see, for example, Boyd, Harrington, & Macauley, 1996; English & Peretz, 
1998; Howland, 2000; Schoenbaum, 2002). Other work on general brownfields issues has 
tackled a wide array of disparate topics including, among others, rural sites (National 
Association of Development Organizations Research Foundation, 1999), public health concerns 
(Greenberg, Lee, & Powers, 1998; Pendergrass, 1999), urban revitalization and sprawl (Dorsey, 
2003; National Governors Association, 2000), the role of community land development entities 
(Leigh, 2000), decision models (Attoh-Okine & Gibbons, 2001), conversion of contaminated 
urban sites to green spaces (DeSousa, 2003), and environmental justice concerns (Anderson & 
Clemens, 1999; Engel, 1997-1998; Rowan & Fridgen, 2003).  
A second line of brownfields study has emphasized pragmatic features of brownfields 
programs. The Northeast-Midwest Institute (NEMW), for example, has issued several guides to 
facilitate brownfields redevelopment, including overviews of federal brownfields initiatives 
(Bartsch & Dorfman, 2000), financing mechanisms (Bartsch, Undated), and opportunities for 
community involvement (Bartsch, 2003). In addition, the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has 
issued a guidebook for property owners and others interested in redeveloping brownfield 
properties (Environmental Law Institute, 1999), as have a number of other entities (Davis, 2002; 
Green, 1996; International City/County Management Association, 2001; Meyer & 
VanLandingham, 2000).  
In addition to these two threads of work, a small number of studies have relied on original 
surveys to systematically collect information on the scope of the brownfields problem, 
characteristics of brownfield sites, and attitudes toward and experiences with their 
5 redevelopment. Lange and McNeil (2004a; 2004b) report survey data from nearly 160 
brownfields stakeholders and project personnel from 75 federal brownfield pilot projects on the 
factors that contributed to success of brownfield redevelopments. They find that a host of factors 
related to project costs and timing, support of local leaders and the community, financing, and 
availability of financial incentives appear important. EPA also collects information on each site 
that receives support from its brownfields program—it requires that all of its brownfields pilot 
grant recipients report this routinely—although the database with this information is relatively 
new and not readily accessible to the research community. Furthermore, both NEMW and ELI 
regularly issue “State of the State” reports that summarize the development of state brownfield, 
Superfund, and voluntary cleanup programs (Bartsch & Deane, 2002; Environmental Law 
Institute, 2002). These latter two reports, however, target program-wide efforts and 
characteristics rather than features of individual sites.  
For this paper, we draw principally on six additional empirical studies to describe basic 
characteristics of brownfields. These include: 
•  a survey we recently administered to 90 recipients of EPA brownfield pilot grants, which is 
part of our larger study of brownfield developers that we discuss in section 4;  
•  our earlier survey in which we collected answers from more than 250 Wisconsin respondents 
from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to a range of brownfields-related questions 
(Wernstedt, Crooks, & Hersh, 2003); and  
•  our survey on the use of environmental insurance in brownfields development that includes 
responses from roughly 50 private developers of brownfield sites in 19 states (Wernstedt, 
Meyer, & Yount, 2003).  
For expository convenience, we refer to these three studies in the following discussion as 
the “public sector,” “Wisconsin,” and “environmental insurance” studies, respectively. In 
addition, we draw heavily on three surveys conducted by other entities:  
•  an annual survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) of member municipalities that 
targets opportunities and barriers to brownfields redevelopment, with the most recent report 
representing responses from over 240 cities with brownfields (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 
2003);  
•  a series of reviews of media coverage of brownfield redevelopments that the International 
Economic Development Council (IEDC) has conducted, the most recent one conducted in 
cooperation with XL Environmental (XL) and providing information on over 400 brownfield 
sites (XL International and International Economic Development Council, 2002); and  
•  a five-year-old study by the Council for Urban Economic Development (CUED)—IEDC’s 
predecessor organization—that examined 107 brownfield projects in 20 states to document 
the economic benefits of redevelopment (Council for Urban Economic Development, 1999).  
6 We will refer to these latter three external investigations as the “USCM,” “XL/IEDC,” and 
“CUED” studies, respectively. We also use findings from a number of other empirical studies on 
brownfields to make specific points related to the myths, as described in the text.  
Five Myths  
Myth 1: Most brownfield sites are large properties located in economically disadvantaged 
neighborhoods that have heavy contamination from urban industrial activities carried out 
in the past century.  
Many older eastern and midwestern U.S. cities hosted an array of manufacturing activities 
that generated wastes that were disposed of on-site both legally and illegally. As the industrial 
bases in these cities shrank after the mid-1900s, some of these contaminated properties were 
abandoned or transitioned to less intensive use. In many cases, supporting infrastructure also has 
deteriorated and already disadvantaged populations have been further burdened. Evidence from 
the EPA brownfield pilot grant program, for example, shows that the grants typically have 
targeted communities with higher proportions of non-white households and lower median 
household incomes (Solitare & Greenberg, 2002). 
Notwithstanding these patterns, however, numerous brownfield sites can be found in 
mining areas and more generally throughout rural America (National Association of 
Development Organizations Research Foundation, 1999). In addition, while properties that 
hosted manufacturing may make up the plurality of brownfield sites, the brownfields landscape 
is quite heterogeneous. The XL/IEDC review reports industrial activities on about 70% of the 
sites it examined, with public facilities (mostly military) and commercial uses accounting for the 
majority of the remainder. Our environmental insurance survey of nearly 50 private developers 
of brownfield sites found that sites under redevelopment most commonly had hosted light/heavy 
industry (32%), mixed use (26%), commercial (22%), and residential (11%) activities. Many of 
the respondents reported multiple former uses.  
The composition of areas surrounding individual brownfield projects also appears variable. 
The 1999 CUED study of 107 projects around the country indicates that areas within a one-mile 
radius of the projects tend to have higher concentrations of minority populations and households 
below the poverty level than statewide averages. In addition, based on data from the 2000 U.S. 
Census, the median household incomes of the census tracts in which the brownfield projects 
identified in our environmental insurance study are situated typically lie below their 
7 corresponding metropolitan-area wide median household income (about 75% of it on average).3 
However, this ranges from a low of 23% to a high of 136%. Similarly, the non-white population 
of the census tracts with the brownfield projects identified in the environmental insurance survey 
typically constitutes a much higher percentage of the total population than do the metropolitan-
area wide, non-white populations (about twice the rate on average). Again, however, the ratio of 
the proportion of the total population that is non-white in the census tract to the analogous 
metropolitan-wide proportion ranges from 0.1 to almost 6. The 1999 CUED study of 107 
projects around the country reveals similar patterns. 
In terms of site sizes, since we lack a complete inventory of contaminated sites, we do not 
know the average size of a brownfield property. However, the median size of properties 
undergoing redevelopment from the USCM data is about 5 acres, slightly lower than the 8.5-acre 
median size from our environmental insurance survey. This latter figure is comparable to 
findings from our public sector study of EPA brownfield pilot recipients, where two-thirds of our 
respondents reported an average site size under 10 acres and nearly 45% of all respondents a size 
under 5 acres. The 1999 CUED study of 107 projects found a median site size of about 4 acres, 
while the more recent XL/IEDC review reports a much larger median site size of about 40 acres 
(largely because that study focuses on more visible sites that have received media coverage).  
All of these studies likely overstate the average size of contaminated properties, however. A 
more intensive, geographically targeted study at Rutgers by Miller and coauthors (2000a; 2000b) 
of 89 brownfield sites in a dozen New Jersey municipalities—each site had either received a 
grant from the state’s Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund or was identified by 
municipal officials as a property the municipality was seeking to develop—found a median site 
size of about one acre. Given the large number of abandoned gas stations and garages, former 
dry cleaning establishments, small fabrication facilities, leaking underground storage tanks, and 
other facilities that constitute contaminated sites, this lower estimate of average site size is more 
likely representative of the brownfields universe. Some municipalities that have developed 
parcel-based inventories of contaminated sites for tax purposes suggest average brownfield site 
sizes well below one acre (see, for example, City of Milwaukee Department of City 
Development, 2004). 
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8 Myth 2: Environmental requirements pose the biggest obstacles to timely brownfield 
redevelopment. 
Brownfields are characterized in the 2002 federal brownfields law as “real property, the 
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential 
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” In the absence of such 
contamination and the perception that it may be present, the site does not constitute a brownfield 
property. Thus, by definition, environmental requirements play a pivotal role in shaping 
brownfield possibilities. The last three years of the annual USCM survey, for example, reveal 
that the three most commonly cited impediments to brownfields redevelopment—the lack of 
cleanup funds, concerns over environmental liabilities, and the need for environmental 
assessments—all hinge on environmental issues. In our Wisconsin study, over 50% of 
respondents from the private sector noted that the high cost of cleanup is a “very important” 
constraint that makes it difficult for developers to redevelop contaminated properties, with the 
majority of the others indicating that it is an “important” constraint.  
At the same time, however, many non-environmental factors clearly pose important 
barriers. In the 2003 USCM survey, more than 40% of respondents indicated that market 
conditions were one of the five most important impediments that cities encounter in redeveloping 
brownfields. Nearly three dozen private firms responding to a survey by Robertson (1999) 
ranked non-environmental factors—particularly site location, site size and configuration, 
building characteristics, construction cost, and access to a skilled labor force—well ahead  
of environmental liabilities as important final decision criteria for selecting a site for corporate 
relocation or expansion (although environmental liabilities may have played an important  
role in screening sites). In short, basic real estate fundamentals often pose more significant 
obstacles to redevelopment of any previously used urban land than does contamination. Small 
parcel sizes, the high costs of demolishing buildings or upgrading them to current standards, 
inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure, zoning battles, and potential litigation all can make 
the reuse of such land less favorable than in suburban or rural alternatives that are not yet 
developed (Porter, 1995). 
Myth 3: The primary benefits of brownfields redevelopment relate to the improvement of 
environmental quality, including the reduction of sprawl.  
Brownfields redevelopment has been offered as a corrective lens to the federal and state 
laws and regulations that many commentators believe have stigmatized properties and detracted 
from the environmental vitality of neighborhoods. Proponents often portray brownfields 
9 redevelopment as a win-win endeavor, improving environmental quality through cleanup of 
contamination and reducing demand for undeveloped land. The U.S. Council of Environmental 
Quality, drawing on a report from George Washington University (Deason, Sherk, & Carroll, 
2001), emphasized these benefits in a release that noted, “[e]very acre of reclaimed Brownfields 
saves 4.5 acres of greenspace such as park and recreation areas.”4 (White House Council on 
Environmental Quality, 2004). However, this environmental take on brownfields need 
qualification in two dimensions.  
First, economic benefits of brownfields redevelopment often appear to be just as important 
a focus of brownfield projects as environmental benefits. More than 80% of the respondents to 
our public sector survey view more efficient use of public infrastructure, increases in tax 
revenues, and the creation of jobs as an important or very important reason for redeveloping 
contaminated property, roughly the same percentage as those who view protecting public health 
and protecting the natural environment in such a fashion. Our Wisconsin study shows similar 
results, while the three most frequently cited benefits of brownfield redevelopments by 
respondents in the USCM survey—increasing a city’s tax base, neighborhood revitalization, and 
job creation—all center on economic and social rather than environmental factors.  
Second, cleanup approaches at many brownfield properties often rely on legal mechanisms 
referred to as “institutional controls”—such as zoning, property easements and covenants, and 
well drilling bans—to restrict property uses at a site with residual contamination. In our 
environmental insurance study, for example, 38% of the developers noted the use of one or more 
institutional controls, most commonly government controls such as zoning and permitting 
requirements. These institutional controls do not so much as enhance environmental quality 
through the elimination or treatment of contamination as they provide protection by limiting 
exposure to it.  
Myth 4: Public ownership and/or financial assistance are critical for brownfields 
redevelopment.  
In the vernacular of Superfund and brownfields, “deep pocket” parties who are involved in 
a contaminated site are particularly desirable since with uncertain liability and with everything 
else being equal, entities seeking cleanup funds or pressing damage claims are more likely to go 
after parties with substantial financial assets than those in bankruptcy proceedings or those with 
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10 more limited resources. For this reason, contaminated land that has been in public ownership 
often has appeared particularly attractive to prospective developers. In addition, a site under 
public ownership may have access to cheaper capital, be able to earn below-market rate of 
returns, and/or benefit from subsidies that may not be available to sites that are entirely in  
private ownership. However, as the brownfields market matures, public ownership and intensive 
involvement in redevelopments may be less critical than before. Our survey evidence reflects  
this ambiguity.  
Less than 20% of our public sector survey respondents indicate that it is always or almost 
always easier to attract redevelopment to a contaminated site if the property has been publicly 
owned (and nearly twice as many indicate that it is never or almost never the case). The 
XL/IEDC report notes that private development companies by themselves were the developers  
of nearly two-thirds of the sites for which developer information was available, and had a  
role in some of the remaining one-third of sites in conjunction with local governments and 
redevelopment authorities. In addition, work by Meyer and Lyons (2000) indicates that many 
experienced brownfield specialty firms eschew municipal ownership of land because of the 
competitive bidding requirements, loss of privacy regarding redevelopment plans, and delays 
caused by public notification requirements.  
In terms of more direct financial support, public financial assistance in the form of grants 
and loans for land purchase, environmental investigation, environmental cleanup, and the 
construction of the redevelopment remains essential in some situations. All of these types of 
assistance reduce development costs, increasing the expected rate of return on a private 
investment to counter the uncertain liabilities. A broad range of the studies we cite supports this 
interpretation. In the XL/IEDC study, for example, only 20% of the projects for which funding 
information is available relied solely on private funding, with the remaining 80% split roughly 
equally between those who relied solely on public funding and those who used a mix of public 
and private funding. In addition, 85% of the 260-plus representatives of public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors who responded to our Wisconsin survey agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that redevelopment of contaminated properties usually requires financial support from 
local or state public agencies. More than 85% of the respondents from the private sector 
indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that more contaminated sites 
would be redeveloped if more public money were available for site cleanups, roughly the same 
percentage of respondents from the public sector who indicated this. In the CUED study of 107 
brownfield redevelopments, public sources accounted for over one-fourth of total project 
investments.  
11 Myth 5: Local residents typically oppose brownfield redevelopment projects.  
Local hearings regarding development project plans and other input from community 
leaders have been viewed by some as barriers to any type of development because such input 
may result in requirements that cut profit margins or slow real estate deals, where timing and 
cash flow are critical. In the case of brownfields, public input can be particularly problematic 
since it also may involve issues of cleanup and environmental protection. Settings with a legacy 
of distrust because of real or perceived environmental injustices add further complications. Yet, 
at the same time, effective and early public involvement can enhance a project’s bottom line, 
contributing new ideas to a design and garnering important support and buy-in for a reuse that 
local residents may believe benefits their community. 
The survey findings on hand generally support this latter interpretation. Nearly two-thirds 
of our public sector respondents indicate that it is always or almost always beneficial to 
developers to involve residents and community members in designing environmental response 
plans, and very few of the respondents indicate that developers are highly concerned with public 
hearing requirements. In addition, 85% of the XL/IEDC projects for which community opinion 
information was available reported positive opinions, and only about one-quarter of the 
respondents to the USCM survey list community concerns as one of the five most important 
impediments to brownfields redevelopment.  
In our Wisconsin study, there is little evidence of a widespread feeling that community 
opposition is a significant constraint that makes it difficult to redevelop contaminated properties 
in the state. Only 10 of the 260-plus respondents (4%) indicate that community opposition is a 
very important constraint and another 20 (8%) indicate that it is an important constraint. At the 
other end of the spectrum of opinion, nearly 10 times as many indicate it is not a constraint 
(37%) and another 80 respondents (32%) indicate it is a minor constraint. The remaining 19% of 
respondents indicate that it is a moderate constraint. These opinions are largely consistent across 
different respondent groups, although a slightly higher proportion of respondents from the 
private sector indicate that community opposition is a very important or important constraint 
than do respondents from the public or NGO sectors.  
4. Brownfield Interventions 
Our discussion of stylized brownfield myths highlights the variety of brownfield 
developments. They can be situated in diverse communities and may be large or small; reflect 
the legacy of a wide range of prior land use activities; be redeveloped as residential, commercial, 
12 or industrial properties; promote both environmental and economic gains; face a wide range of 
regulatory and nonregulatory barriers to success; and attract both public support and opposition. 
Moreover, as “urban sore spots”—as President Bush characterized them in the 2004 presidential 
debates—they can encompass both relatively narrow, targeted real estate deals and opportunities 
to redress larger ills in America’s cities.  
Notwithstanding the diversity of experiences across brownfield sites, a common thread in 
their redevelopment emerging from surveys and other studies is that the uncertain liabilities in 
redeveloping contaminated sites and the extraordinary (relative to a clean parcel) costs associated 
with investigating and cleaning up such sites can make public interventions in brownfields 
welcome and in some cases essential. Unfortunately, it is not clear what kinds of interventions 
are most valuable. According to the public sector survey, public financial support generally 
appears more attractive when offered as a reimbursement of environmental investigation costs 
rather than a subsidy to construction activities. However, the relative effectiveness of 
nonfinancial interventions—a change in regulatory requirements such as reducing cleanup 
standards or liability relief that releases “innocent” parties at contaminated sites from long-term 
damage claims—may be even more critical.  
To bolster our understanding of what works to stimulate interest in brownfield investments, 
we recently conducted a mail survey of U.S. real estate developers. Our questionnaire asked 
respondents to consider a hypothetical scenario of a contaminated site at which the developer 
was contemplating a multi-unit residential development project. In addition to project financials 
(see Figure 1)—expected land purchase, investigation, remediation, and redevelopment costs and 
expected gross returns on the property—we offered a number of different public interventions 
that developers could choose to improve their expected return on the site. Based on analysis of 
the choices, we can estimate the relative value of the different incentives. 
13 Figure 1: Hypothetical Residential Redevelopment Scenario 
You are deciding whether to make a contract offer on a property. Imagine a townhouse project 
that your company would then lease to individual households. This project would take place 
under the following circumstances: 
 
Market Condition: The project is undertaken in an area with high potential for property value 
appreciation that might raise return above expected values.* 
 
Environmental Assessment Cost: The expected cost for environmental studies, including 
assessment, sampling, and response planning is $100,000. 
 
Site Remediation Cost: Based on known prior uses, the environmental engineers report that the 
expected cost for meeting state regulatory requirements is $900,000, including protection from 
any cost overruns. 
 
Land Cost: The expected purchase price for the site is $6 million. 
 
Development Cost: The expected development cost at the site, including construction, 
marketing, interest, legal and administrative fees, etc., is $18 million (in addition to acquisition, 
assessment, and cleanup costs)  
 
Revenues: The expected present value of the townhouse development after construction is $30 
million   
*Half of the respondents received a questionnaire with high potential for market appreciation and half received a questionnaire 
with little potential for market appreciation. Relevant costs for the project with little potential appreciation were scaled downward 
but expected rate of return on investment (ROI) is 20% in both scenarios.  
 
Figure 2: Incentives Available in Choice Experiments 
1. Site assessment cost reimbursement (two values):  $0 or $100,000 
2. Public hearing (two values):  Required or not required 
3. Protection from additional cleanup cost (two values):  Available or not available 
4. Protection from third-party liability claims (two values): Available or not available 
5. Subsidy for redevelopment (four values)  $0, $125,000, $250,000, or 500,000 
 
14 Alberini, Meyer, and Wernstedt (2004) provide more details on the instrument, but briefly 
our approach rests on a series of conjoint choice experiments, in each of which respondents 
choose between two alternative packages of interventions (referred to as attributes in the lexicon 
of conjoint choice experiments).5 The interventions that we evaluate are: 
•  reimbursement of the environmental assessment cost 
•  imposition of an additional public hearing requirement 
•  relief from liability for future cleanup at the site 
•  relief from liability claims by third parties such as site workers and adjacent land 
owners 
•  financial subsidies for redevelopment activities. 
In each experiment, respondents can reject both alternative packages of attributes and choose a 
“do neither” option.  
We assume respondents will choose the alternatives that yield the highest utility based on 
the financial conditions we provide and the developers’ own internal investment calculations. 
We model the choices with a conditional logit model, with the first four intervention attributes 
appearing as binary 0/1 variables (either not present or present) and the financial subsidy taking 
on one of four possible values ($0, $125,000, $250,000, and $500,000). This latter variable 
allows us to estimate the dollar value of each intervention based on the ratio of their regression 
coefficients (see Figure 2). Altogether with five experiments per respondent and 300 
respondents, we have roughly 1,500 responses to model. 
In addition to the choice experiments, we ask a number of background questions related to 
characteristics of the respondents and their firms and experience with redeveloping contaminated 
sites (see Table 1). Nearly 90% of the 300-plus respondents themselves are engaged in real estate 
development, and roughly the same percentage has experience with infill development. In 
                                                 
5 Conjoint choice experiments entail a stated preference survey approach in which respondents are asked to identify 
their preferred choice out of a limited set of hypothetical alternatives (Louviere, 1996). In our case, each alternative 
contains a combination of the public interventions we are interested in evaluating. Through statistical analysis of 
choices identified by a range of respondents—and with a range of different choice scenarios presented to each 
respondent—we can estimate the relative value or weight that respondents place on the different attributes. This 
approach can help to reduce strategic behavior (Adamowicz, Louviere, & Swait, 1998)—efforts to “game” the 
survey and provide misleading values—and facilitates responses since it requires simpler binary choices rather than 
interval-level values or even full ordinal rankings. Most simply, it imposes constraints and forces respondents to 
make choices and tradeoffs rather than allows them to select a wide range of features that real-world budget 
constraints would not permit. 
15 addition, about 80% have done residential projects and slightly less have experience at sites with 
contamination. About one-fourth of those with contamination experience conduct more than 60% 
of their projects on contaminated sites, a group that we have called brownfield specialists. A 
minority of respondents have received public subsidies for either environmental work 
(assessments or cleanup) or construction.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable   % sample
(n=313) 
Notes 
real estate developer  89.2  All other respondents are construction or 
consultants 
residential background  79.0  respondent experienced w/ residential projects 
infill experience  91.9  respondent experienced w/ infill project 
contamination experience   77.7  > 0 projects w/ contamination 
brownfield specialist  19.0  > 60% of projects have been at contaminated sites 
cleanup experience   76.0  > 0 projects w/ cleanup done 
abandoned project  32.0  > 0 projects abandoned due to cleanup cost 
environmental subsidy  23.0  > 0 projects w/ public assessment/cleanup $ 
construction subsidy  33.0  > 0 projects w/ public construction $ 
make decision  90.0  respondent partly makes investment decision 
Neither choice  31.2  respondent chooses neither incentive bundle 
 
These summary statistics are reassuring since they suggest that the hypothetical 
redevelopment scenario we presented (Figure 1) falls in the range of projects with which the 
respondents are familiar. The project as described is an expected $30 million gross return on a 
$25 million expected investment, yielding an expected net return on investment of 20%. Slightly 
more than half of our respondents indicated that this project was about the same scale as their 
projects, with the remainder split roughly equally between those who indicated they generally 
worked on larger projects and those who generally worked on smaller projects. In addition, the 
hypothetical project we presented and the choices of incentive bundles that we offered appear 
reasonable in light of the fact that in about one-third of the choices made by respondents, the “do 
neither” option was selected (bottom line of Table 1).  
The coefficients from our conditional logit regression for the non-monetary attributes—
public hearing, liability protection from additional cleanup, protection from 3
rd party liability—
were all significant at the 0.01 level, with expected signs. Dollar values calculated from these 
coefficients appear in Table 2. We can see, for example, that the “value” of an additional public 
hearing on a developer’s cleanup plan is negative (it imposes a dollar cost). In principle, as we 
16 noted earlier, a public hearing could broaden community support for a project, but overall the 
developers appear to think that such a hearing could delay a project or otherwise raise its costs. 
In contrast, liability protection against additional cleanup requirements if standards change or if 
more existing contamination is discovered in the future provides a large positive gain to 
developers, more than three times the negative value of the public hearing requirement in terms 
of absolute value (i.e., ignoring signs, the value of the additional cleanup liability is more than 
three times the value of the public hearing requirement). This suggests that even when packaged 
with additional public hearing requirements, the value of liability relief for future cleanups is 
strongly positive. Developers appear to value protection from 3
rd party liability claims by 
workers or neighbors even more highly; the dollar benefits of this incentive are about 40% 
higher than the one for future cleanup liability relief. The import of these numbers to the bottom 
line of the hypothetical project appear in the rightmost column of Table 2, where the proportion 
of profits that the values represents range from roughly 5% (negative) to more than 20%.  
Table 2: Value of Incentives, All Respondents 
  $Value  % of Project 
Cost 
% of Project 
Profit 
Public hearing requirement  -$212,000  0.9%  4.7% 
Eliminating all cleanup cost risk*  $702,000  3.1%  15.6% 
Eliminating 3rd party liability risk*  $969,000  4.1%  21.5% 
*liability protection provided upon state approval of environmental response  
 
If we split the sample between the 20% of respondents with significant experience on 
contaminated land and the 80% of respondents with less experience, we can see some important 
differences in how developers view the attributes (Table 3). The experienced subsample places 
roughly the same value on relief from future cleanup liability as does the less-experienced 
subsample, but this value is roughly the same as the value these experienced developers place on 
3
rd party liability relief. Thus, comparing the value placed by the experienced subsample on 3
rd 
party relief and the value placed by the less-experienced subsample on 3
rd party relief yields a 
wide discrepancy (the ratio of the values on this incentive is 0.6). In addition, the negative value 
of the public hearing requirement for the experienced subsample is only about half the analogous 
value for the less-experienced subsample. Thus, the experienced developers do not appear to 
view public hearings as imposing as high a cost on a project as do the less experienced 
developers. And finally, although not shown in Table 3, more experienced developers placed a 
higher value dollar-for-dollar on the reimbursement of assessments costs than on other cash 
support. This reflects the fact that reimbursement would occur regardless of the final disposition 
17 of the property, while other cash subsidies would be received only were the project to move 
forward. In contrast, the less experienced developers placed equivalent values on the two types 
of financial incentives.  
Table 3: Value of Incentives, Respondent Subgroups 
Experience with Brownfields  Specialists Non-specialists 
Public hearing requirement  -$129,000  -$237,000 
Eliminating all cleanup cost risk*  $681,000  $727,000 
Eliminating 3rd party liability risk*  $649,000  $1,081,000 
*liability protection provided upon state approval of environmental response  
 
5. Future Directions: A Modest Proposal 
As policy on contaminated land has evolved and experiences with reusing it have 
accumulated over the last decade, brownfields redevelopment has matured, become 
mainstreamed in many aspects, and begun to yield projects that rely less on uniquely structured 
deals specific to the environmental characteristics of the site and more on standard real estate 
practice. It stretches credulity to claim that brownfields practice has become a routine matter, yet 
selling brownfield properties has become more normalized as common real estate issues rather 
than problems related to remediation have begun to fundamentally (and, in some situations, 
almost exclusively) drive redevelopment at contaminated sites. The growth of the environmental 
insurance market has helped at many larger sites, since insurance can cost-effectively reduce 
uncertainties and provide the liability protection that private developers appear to highly prize.  
Significant challenges remain, however, if brownfields redevelopment is to go beyond a 
series of real estate deals that perpetuate existing development patterns and move to be an engine 
of sustainable development. Significantly more public resources may be needed for assessment, 
cleanup, and redevelopment of the tens of thousands of properties around the country whose 
economics are either too dire or too uncertain to attract interest. Small tracts of contaminated 
land, in particular, may be unattractive to developers since transaction costs of dealing with 
regulatory agencies may constitute a relatively high proportion of project investments.  
Tools for addressing uncertainty such as environmental insurance are generally not cost-
effective for these smaller sites, so public agencies often have pursued a course of assembling 
smaller parcels to yield a larger site that would be attractive to private developers. This approach, 
18 however, not only requires contiguous properties but it also may be counterproductive from the 
perspective of private firms who eschew such public interventions (Meyer & Lyons, 2000). To 
the extent that necessary legal, political, and fiscal conditions are in place, other mechanisms 
such as tax increment financing may be a more appropriate approach for public support. Owner-
financed tax increment financing—wherein an owner rather than a municipality takes on the risk 
of the failure of a development to generate new taxes—also may be feasible. General bonding, 
which already provides brownfield funds in several states, may be an additional option. At  
the federal level, modest modifications or extensions of tax incentives targeting brownfields 
could improve brownfield project economics. Perhaps most radically, reauthorization of the 
currently lapsed federal Superfund tax could prove more politically palatable if a portion of the 
revenues were dedicated to leveraging municipal or state resources grant programs for 
brownfields cleanup.  
More innovative approaches, however, may be needed since even under optimistic federal, 
state, and local fiscal scenarios, public funding is unlikely to supply more than modest 
assistance. In particular, to link brownfields and sustainable practice, practitioners need to move 
beyond a property-by-property approach and place brownfields in a larger-scale endeavor that 
seeks to revitalize a wider area of the community (Meyer, 1998). This may require as much an 
ideological shift from the current conventional practice that centers on shrewd, property-specific 
brownfield real estate developments to wider community concerns. Nonetheless, an areawide 
approach that explicitly treats multiple brownfield properties as a system and tackles them en 
masse rather than each in isolation could improve the prospects for community revitalization in 
four related ways.  
First, undertaking the redevelopment of multiple small brownfield properties in a 
coordinated fashion can be financially attractive for both the public and for private developers, 
particularly for residential reuse. For the public, the cumulative effects of redeveloping multiple 
properties can increase property values, tax revenues, and other community benefits over an 
entire neighborhood depressed by a small number of contaminated sites. For private developers, 
increases in property values over a neighborhood may increase the expected market price for 
new housing to a high enough level that a developer will undertake a new project. Absent 
sufficiently high market rates, anticipated public benefits may justify subsidies that reduce 
investment risks and provide the developer with an acceptable rate of return.  
Second, an areawide brownfields approach may allow larger dollar investments in cleanup 
and redevelopment that can take advantage either of economies of scale in infrastructure for 
redevelopment and in remediation or of risk-sharing opportunities across multiple sites. For 
19 example, the cost of investigating contamination and in remediating 10 properties in a 
coordinated fashion may be far less than doing each one in isolation, particularly if the  
properties share a common environmental problem (such as underlying groundwater 
contamination) and can use a similar remedial strategy. Even if the contamination problems are 
dissimilar, when bundled as a portfolio the exceptional risk of one property encountering 
unanticipated and potentially costly cleanup surprises may be balanced by the unexceptional 
risks of the other nine properties.  
Third, if multiple contaminated properties within a defined area can be put under single 
ownership, an areawide brownfields approach may make environmental insurance a financially 
critical part of a redevelopment strategy. Such insurance can provide protection against 
unanticipated overruns in cleanup costs, as well as provide liability protections for a wide range 
of risks such as the discovery of additional contamination or lawsuits by site workers or adjacent 
property owners for damages for personal injuries suffered as a result of the contamination. As 
we saw in the previous section, both of these types of protection appear to have a high value for 
developers. The insurance is currently unaffordable for small projects, but bundling multiple 
properties together could make it cost-effective.  
Finally, an areawide approach can turn traditional brownfields redevelopment on its head 
by placing it in a comprehensive, integrated planning framework that takes advantage of the 
opportunities provided by brownfields. Rather than limiting the benefits of brownfields 
redevelopment to the sum of the benefits from individual projects, a community undertaking an 
areawide approach can design the redevelopments so they are complementary and synergistic 
such that the whole exceeds the sum of the parts.  
The One-Cleanup program and areawide cleanup pilots that are part of EPA’s Land 
Revitalization Agenda (Horinko, 2003) provide a step in the direction of areawide regeneration, 
but the success of the approach ultimately will rest on practice at the local rather than federal 
level. Such has been the case with much brownfields innovation and reform. To the extent that 
local efforts to promote more areawide benefits from brownfields redevelopment get off the 
ground, they are likely to follow the same trial-and-error experimental process that have 
characterized much of brownfields.  
6. Final Thoughts 
Even as environmental issues in the U.S. court of public opinion arguably have taken a 
backstage to concerns over terrorism, national security, military engagement overseas, and the 
20 economy, the redevelopment of brownfields and other policies to reduce environmental and 
public health risk and restore blighted communities continues to have political traction. For 
example, the Congressional vote to pass the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act in late 2001 was overwhelming and bi-partisan. More recently, the Sierra 
Club has attempted to draw on popular support for cleanup in its ad campaign in swing states to 
highlight the Bush administration’s opposition to renewing the corporate taxes that support the 
federal Superfund program (Inside EPA, 2004a).  
Numerous groups representing a wide range of interests—developers, engineers, local 
appointed and elected officials, lenders, regulators, and the environmental community—continue 
to support brownfields redevelopment and interest in brownfields continues to grow. The crowd 
at the national brownfields conference in September 2004, for example, exceeded 4,000 
attendees. Yet, the offering at this conference of a new forum for parties to come together to craft 
redevelopment deals epitomizes the emphasis many give to brownfields, namely the promotion 
of successful real estate transactions. More deeply rooted and knotty concerns related to the 
revitalization of neighborhoods remain underemphasized, in our view, and critical appraisals of 
the reality and outcomes of brownfield redevelopments are sorely needed. For example: 
•  Does the remediation strategy of choice at many brownfield sites–to leave contamination in 
place but limit the exposure of the public to it through capping, fences, and institutional 
controls—unfairly or unwisely transfer risk to future generations? 
•  Is it appropriate to de-emphasize the “brown” in federal, state, and local brownfields 
programs and focus on economic development priorities?  
•  To what extent do the economic benefits of a redeveloped brownfield property reflect a 
transfer of economic activity from one part of the community or region to another part? 
•  How can vulnerable or distressed populations—those who often have the fewest tools and 
skills to make brownfields redevelopment work—keep the benefits of brownfields 
regeneration within their communities? 
•  Do brownfield programs empower communities to address their environmental and 
economic stresses or do they further dependencies on federal largesse?  
•  What should be the appropriate balance between public and private benefits of brownfields 
redevelopment? 
Some of these questions have begun to attract discussion, as witnessed by an increasing 
interest in systematic measurement of the benefits of reuse of brownfield sites and tracking the 
outcomes of cleanup programs (Inside EPA, 2004b; www.rff.org/sitereuse). However, if the 
brownfields phenomenon is to be more than much ado about nothing and to achieve its enormous 
promise—to move well beyond rhetorical accomplishments and real estate successes of shrewd 
21 public and private entrepreneurs—questions such as these need to be squarely faced. Resolving 
them can go a long way toward helping brownfields practice grow toward a healthy integration 
of economic and environmental policy and toward the construction of more sustainable 
communities.  
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